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Abstract This paper presents an optimization model to simulate short-term pair-wise spot-market trad-
ing of surface water abstraction licenses (water rights). The approach uses a node-arc multicommodity for-
mulation that tracks individual supplier-receiver transactions in a water resource network. This enables
accounting for transaction costs between individual buyer-seller pairs and abstractor-speciﬁc rules and
behaviors using constraints. Trades are driven by economic demand curves that represent each abstractor’s
time-varying water demand. The purpose of the proposed model is to assess potential hydrologic and eco-
nomic outcomes of water markets and aid policy makers in designing water market regulations. The model
is applied to the Great Ouse River basin in Eastern England. The model assesses the potential weekly water
trades and abstractions that could occur in a normal and a dry year. Four sectors (public water supply,
energy, agriculture, and industrial) are included in the 94 active licensed water diversions. Each license’s
unique environmental restrictions are represented and weekly economic water demand curves are esti-
mated. Rules encoded as constraints represent current water management realities and plausible
stakeholder-informed water market behaviors. Results show buyers favor sellers who can supply large vol-
umes to minimize transactions. The energy plant cooling and agricultural licenses, often restricted from
obtaining water at times when it generates beneﬁts, beneﬁt most from trades. Assumptions and model limi-
tations are discussed.
1. Introduction
Current and future regional water scarcity is stimulating efforts world wide to allow economically efﬁcient
reallocation of resources toward higher-value uses. Regulated market-assisted allocation of water is gaining
support but the regulatory details of each regional market will need to reﬂect local water management,
social and intuitional needs to receive widespread support. This creates a demand for the ability to under-
stand and predict how water markets could perform under a range of hydrologic, institutional, and regula-
tory environments. Water markets’ performance will depend on which transactions occur when, involving
what quantity, and between which water right holders.
Modeling water markets realistically has remained elusive because of the challenge of representing how
a multitude of actors interact amongst themselves, with institutions and with the spatially and tempo-
rally varying hydrological environment. Different approaches to modeling water resource systems with
water trades exist in the literature. Hydro-economic models [Harou et al., 2009] were the ﬁrst to model
combined spatially and temporally distributed hydrology and economic-driven allocation of water. Clas-
sical optimization-driven hydro-economic models have typically focused on the potential system-wide
economic gains from water trading but have not represented individual level transaction detail of water
markets and trading behavior. Grifﬁn states that, in previous efforts to model water markets, ‘‘Too much
is omitted to associate results with potential market results. The behaviors of individual agents (true mar-
ket agents) are not represented, and the frictional transaction costs of market activity are neglected too’’
[Grifﬁn, 2006, p. 356]. This has been the focus of new approaches that aim to represent more realistic
‘‘agent’’ behavior [Berger et al., 2007; Bonabeau, 2002; Giuliani and Castelletti, 2013; Yang et al., 2009;
Zhao et al., 2013]. ‘‘Agent’’ in this context refers to water users and in some cases a wider array of actors
including institutional ones. Recent efforts in modeling innovative water market structures also include
auction-based systems (smart markets), where each user trades with the auction manager [Raffensperger
and Cochrane, 2010; Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011].
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Recent contributions to water resource network modeling [Cheng et al., 2009; Erfani et al., 2013] allow
accounting for the relationships between water sellers and buyers, i.e., track transactions in water
resource networks. This allows optimization-based hydro-economic models, where movement of water is
driven by hydrological inﬂows and time-changing demand curves, to get a step closer to simulating water
markets because distinct user-deﬁned transaction costs can be designed and introduced into the model
for each pair of potential trading partners. Using a mathematical programming-based model formulation
where each time step is an independent optimization model allows adding rules that help represent
some degree of realistic agent (individual river abstractor) behavior. In this paper, water users have lim-
ited foresight of future river ﬂows and make abstraction decisions for the following week based on the
information available at the time. Hence, the optimization problem is solved sequentially on a weekly
basis. The model takes the previous water availability, reservoir storage level, and catchment-speciﬁc con-
ditions as input data prior to solving for each week. Afterward, water allocation is obtained only for the
current week. This continues for all 52 weeks until the end of the year. The contribution of this paper is
adding to an optimization-driven hydro-economic model (a) pair-wise transaction costs between all
potential trading partners and (b) custom user rules in an effort to simulate potential water market
behaviors.
Below section 2 presents the proposed approach and model formulation. Section 3 describes an application
of the model to the Great Ouse river basin in Eastern England. This includes additional case-study-speciﬁc
model constraints added to the basic model formulation. Results of simulations with and without the water
market are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses beneﬁts and limitations of the proposed approach
and is followed by conclusions.
2. Methods
The proposed model uses a node-arc multicommodity formulation following the transaction tracking
method of Erfani et al. [2013]. The water resource system is represented by a network of nodes and links.
Following classical hydro-economic optimization modeling practice, the model is driven by a single-
objective optimization function to simulate water transfers that could occur in a market with perfect infor-
mation. Perfect information refers to the fact that all agents know each other’s value of water in each time
step. To this are added rules, through use of constraints and penalties as explained below, to make water
license-holder trading behaviors more realistic.
2.1. Proposed Approach
The proposed water market model is used to simulate short-term (spot market) trading behavior amongst
individual water rights holders. Model predictions demonstrate intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation
of water and the resulting hydrological outcomes.
The model considers pair-wise trading by water rights holders who possess full information on marginal val-
ues of water of all other river abstractors in the system. A single-objective function means the model imple-
ments those trades which maximize regional economic beneﬁts at each time step. The model assumes
users with higher willingness to pay for water will buy from abstractors with lower marginal beneﬁts if trans-
action costs do not sufﬁciently discourage it. The individual preferences of speciﬁc abstractors to trade or
not trade with other users can be accounted for, if known, through detailed user-to-user transaction costs
or rules imposed as constraints in the mathematical program.
A market with perfect information is a framework for approximating a ‘‘best-case’’ situation where all water
rights holders would participate in the market using, for example, an online information and transaction
system that allows viewing prices offered by others. In such a system trades would be preauthorized by an
agency only after it could ensure transfers do not harm other abstractors or the environment.
The theory that market-based allocation of resources driven by self-interested individuals serves the com-
mon good of society dates back to Adam Smith and the concept of ‘‘invisible hand’’ [Bennett, 2005]. Agents
act to maximize their own beneﬁt, and in the process, scarce resources are allocated to the highest-value
uses, maximizing the overall beneﬁts to society as a result. For water markets to produce efﬁcient allocation
of resources, water rights need to be well deﬁned and protected, and both positive and negative external-
ities need to be accounted for [Freebairn, 2005].
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Allocative efﬁciency is achieved when marginal values of the resource in all uses are equal [Bennett, 2005].
This ‘‘equi-marginal’’ principle is expected to hold in a market characterized by perfect information and per-
fect competition. In market-based water allocation, however, marginal values are different across various
types of use and locations of abstractors [Cai, 2008]. The reasons for this are institutional and hydrologic
constraints on water trading [Cai, 2008; Colby et al., 1993] such as the transaction costs and system market-
constraining rules presented below.
2.2. Transaction Costs
Grifﬁn [2006] posits that a model of water market would necessarily need to include transaction costs. Costs
incurred, for example, to ﬁnd trade partners and to study and execute transactions need to be reﬂected in
the model. McCann and Easter [2004] set out a framework for analyzing costs associated with water
exchange under different allocation mechanisms. For formal water markets, each stage of the trading pro-
cess incurs costs. Costs that should be accounted for are associated with: (a) set up of the system, including
legislation changes and design of the infrastructure, (b) pretrade costs of information gathering, (c) legal
and professional contracting costs, and (d) costs of administering the system, including monitoring and
resolving conﬂicts.
In the model presented in this paper, the costs are represented by a per-trade ﬁxed charge and variable costs
that increase with the volumetric size of the transaction, payable by the buyer. The ﬁxed charge reﬂects cost
recovery of cost types (a) and (d) by the agency running the system, whereas the variable costs reﬂect (b) and
(c). The assumption is that variable costs increase roughly proportionally with the size of the transaction. We
have modeled a situation where a regulator further taxes transactions following the consumptiveness of the
buyer relative to that of the seller. That is, if the buyer’s diversion produces lower return ﬂows than that of the
seller, the costs will be higher than if they were equal. This would account for some of the negative effects the
transaction has on other users and the environment. At an aggregate level, after water is used, if a lower pro-
portion of the volume abstracted is returned, less will be available for others to abstract. In other words, this
regulation makes steps toward internalizing the negative externalities associated with the transaction. Section
3.4 details the transaction cost structure assumed in our case study.
2.3. Model Formulation
This section outlines the mathematical programming model formulation which allows representing pair-
wise trading (see Appendix A for nomenclature).
2.3.1. Objective Function
The beneﬁt function quantiﬁes total economic beneﬁts generated by water abstractors from water use in
each time step, expressed in monetary terms. Economic beneﬁts from water abstraction for water users are
represented as a function of allocation; beneﬁt functions are obtained by integrating inverse water demand
functions. All factors affecting users’ water demand are exogenous and stay constant for our analysis.
The model includes a reservoir facility for water storage. The preference for speciﬁc storage levels through-
out the year is enforced by penalizing deviation from the target level of reservoir. This can be considered an
‘‘agent’’ rule added to the model to ensure modeled behaviors are as realistic as possible.
The model is solved by maximizing an objective function variable:
Objective5
X
iUser
totalBenefiti 2
X
i2User
X
kOwner
totalCostik2
X
j2Reservoir
Penaltyj: (1)
The totalBenefiti generated by license holder i is a function of the total volume abstracted by user i in each
time period:
totalBenefiti5
X
k2Owner
f ðWaterAbstractedki Þ; (2)
where WaterAbstractedki is the sum of water volumes abstracted using one’s own license and purchased
from other users. f ðWaterAbstractedki Þ is a piece-wise linear quadratic beneﬁt function derived from each
user’s inverse demand curve (see section 3.3).
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The cost of trading incurred in each time period is the sum of ﬁxed per-trade costs cki
 
and per-Ml variable
costs dki
 
for each user i purchased from user k:
totalCostik5cik1dikWaterAbstracted
k
i ; 8i 2 User; 8k 2 Owner: (3)
The last term in the objective function (1) is the absolute value of reservoir level deviation from its target
multiplied by a penalty factor a (see section 3.2).
2.3.2. Model Constraints
Generic constraints to represent water resource systems with trade transactions are listed below; speciﬁc
constraints to reﬂect management rules and behaviors are described in the case-study section.
In the following equations, i belongs to the set of all users including agriculture, industry, water supply, and
energy. Index k distinguishes between different types of water, which includes the river (licensed water in
the river abstracted by the users) and the sellers’ licenses (See Nomenclature in Appendix A for further
details). In this formulation, index k is added to the ﬂow decision variable to simultaneously describe physi-
cal water delivery network and water’s origin and hence its ownership. Tagging ownership allows supplier-
receiver transaction tracking.
2.3.2.1. Mass Balance at Junction Nodes
Water balance at each junction node is ensured throughout the modeled river network. Water entering
junction node i plus the inﬂows at the same node equals the water leaving node i:
X
j
COji51
xkji 1 inFli 1
X
l 2 User
k 2 river
ReturnFlowli 5
X
j
COij51
xkij
8i 2 Junction; 8k 2 Owner; DWli51
(4)
Since inFli is a river ﬂow and initially belongs to no users, there is no need to index it by indicator k.
2.3.2.2. Storage Balance
Storage balance states that the volume of water in reservoir in each time step equals the volume carried
over from the previous time step, net of changes due to addition from river abstractions and water taken
out of the reservoir for consumption.
X
i
COij51
xkij 1 pRes
k
j 5 Res
k
j 1
X
i
COji51
xkji ; 8j 2 Reservoir; 8k 2 Owner: (5)
2.3.2.3. Abstraction Balance
The user node consumes WaterAbstractedki , including water from its own license and potentially from buy-
ing from other water right holders, and sells the rest of its licensed water volumes to others (Trade).
X
j
COji51
xkji 5
X
j
COij51
xkij 1 WaterAbstracted
k
i 1 Trade
k2river
i ; 8i 2 User; 8k 2 Owner; (6)
where
Tradek2riveri 5
X
j
COij51
xiij 8i 2 User: (7)
Variable WaterAbstractedki represents the sum of water bought and abstracted using one’s own license. To
track the transaction from the original license holder to the recipient, the positive variable Trade is added to
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the node mass balance equation of the original license holder. Therefore, Tradek2riveri is the volume of water
transferred from the user i down the river to the recipient(s).
2.3.2.4. Return Flows
Some water uses are not fully consumptive, and water leaves the user node and is returned to the river for
abstraction by users downstream (Return ﬂow).
ReturnFlowij5
P
kOwner
ð12consFactoriÞWaterAbstractedki ;
8i 2 User; 8j 2 Junction; DWij51:
(8)
Once return ﬂow is calculated, it is balanced using the junction nodes set of equations (4). Return ﬂows are
assumed to come back to the river without ownership and hence there is no need to ﬂag it using index k.
2.3.2.5. Mass Balance at Discharge Zone
Excess water is discharged at the ﬁnal node (sink) downstream of the river section.
X
k2river
X
i
COij51
xkij 5Dischargej; 8j 2 Discharge: (9)
2.3.2.6. License Constraints
The volume of water allocated to each license holder can either be abstracted for local consumption or sold
to other users. In other words, the sum of the water volumes abstracted using one’s own license and sold
cannot exceed total licensed amount per time step.
WaterAbstractedki 1Trade
k
i  WkLii ; 8i 2 User; k 2 river: (10)
Annual cumulative consumption is tracked and water right holders cannot exceed their annual volumetric
allocation.
A sale can be made only to users located downstream of the seller, along the same river or tributary, or
from tributary to the main river. This is done to minimize trade-induced third party license derogation, i.e.,
when a sale upstream prevents water users located between the buyer and seller to achieve their intended
diversion.
3. Great Ouse River Case Study
This section introduces the case-study river basin and describes further constraint equations added to the
proposed model to reﬂect local water management. The model was applied to the 3000 km2 Upper Ouse
and Bedford Ouse river basin of Eastern England (Figure 1). Annual rainfall averages range from 670 mm
(west) to 540 mm (eastern catchment) [Environment Agency, 2005].
3.1. Water Use
Data on 205 surface water abstraction licenses (water rights for diversion and consumptive use) and
monthly volumes abstracted by license holders over 2006–2011 were obtained from the Environment
Agency (EA). There were no abstractions over that period for 111 licenses which are assumed unused.
Although the EA allows trading of unused licenses in some basins [Environment Agency, 2011] because the
Great Ouse is overlicensed and overabstracted we assumed dormant licenses cannot be traded in our
model runs. The remaining 94 river water abstraction licenses were represented individually in the model.
Licenses were divided into four categories: Agriculture, Public and Private Water Supply, Industry, and
Energy. Table 1 provides summary statistics on the active licenses and Figure 1 shows approximate abstrac-
tion locations.
The model includes an energy sector abstractor: a gas power station using water for cooling. Two surface
water abstraction licenses are held by the regional public water supply (PWS) company. One is used to ﬁll
the PWS Reservoir (Figure 1) and another is a direct river intake upstream of the reservoir (Figure 1).
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3.2. Water Allocation
This section describes current and potential future water management arrangements in the catchment and
in England and Wales generally and how they are represented in the optimization model constraint set.
3.2.1. Water Licensing System
Diversions (abstractions) of water from surface water and groundwater sources in England and Wales are
regulated by the Environment Agency (EA). Water allocation is managed through a licensing system
whereby an abstractor obtains a license specifying the conditions under which water abstraction is
authorized. These conditions include the volume of water permitted for abstraction, water use descrip-
tion, location of abstraction, and special conditions under which abstraction is to be reduced or
suspended.
The two major cases under which abstraction is prevented are Hands-off (environmental) ﬂows and rules
deﬁned in Section 57 of the Water Resources Act, 1991 (Section 57). Hands-off Flow (HoF) rules are condi-
tions on licenses that specify the minimum ﬂow in the river below which the affected licenses must reduce
or stop their abstractions [Environment Agency, 2012c]. The purpose of HoF rules is to ensure water availabil-
ity for priority uses and to protect the environment during drought. Section 57 rules describe emergency
provisions for managing spray irrigation licenses in case of drought. These provisions limit or prohibit
abstractions for the purposes of spray irrigation to ensure public water supply needs are met [Environment
Agency, 2012a].
Table 1. Active Abstraction Licenses in the Great Ouse Basin
Sector
Percentage of the Total Number
of Active Licenses Held by Sector
Percentage of the Total Yearly Volume
Licensed for Abstraction Held by Sector
Agriculture 91.5 1.7
Public and private water supply 5.3 93.7
Industry 2.1 <1
Energy 1.1 4.5
Figure 1. Approximate active abstractor locations and main ﬂow observation gauges represented by points A (last gauge in the basin, sink), B (Offord gauge), and C (gauge, deﬁning
abstraction restrictions for the power station license).
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3.2.2. Modeling License Restrictions: Hands-Off Flows and Section 57
If ﬂow at a ﬂow observation gauge is less than the minimum ﬂow set by a HoF rule speciﬁed in the license,
the abstractor is not allowed to divert water from the river or sell any part of the license.
ðflGAj  AlGAjÞ ! ð WaterAbstractedk2riveri 1 Tradek2riveri 5 0Þ;
8i 2 User; j 2 Gauge; RuGAij51:
(11)
There are two major HoF rule types applied in the basin. The ﬁrst is the rule termed the ‘‘Offord Clause’’ that
refers to the ﬂow passing through the gauge located near Offord (Point B in Figure 1). It protects the PWS
Reservoir license held by the local public water supply company to ensure other licenses do not derogate it.
The second type is based on local ﬂow conditions. These HoF conditions set minimum ﬂow requirements
for 11 gauges distributed throughout the basin. Twenty eight active modeled licenses are affected by HoF
conditions below which licenses are temporarily suspended.
Under Section 57 of the 1991 Water Resources Act agricultural abstraction can be reduced by the EA under
dry conditions when PWS is under threat. In the model, this is represented by a 50% reduction in weekly
abstraction by spray irrigators when river ﬂow is lower than the ﬂow which is exceeded on average 95% of
the time (Q95). Agricultural users who face this temporary decrease in their licensed volumes are located
upstream of the corresponding gauging station recording low ﬂow.
ð flGAj  Q95GAjÞ ! ðWaterAbstractedk2riveri 1 Tradek2riveri  0:5 3 WkLiiÞ;
8i 2 Agriculture; j 2 Gauge;UpGAij51:
(12)
The above if-then conditions (equations (11) and (12)) are checked ofﬂine prior to solving for each time
step of the model.
3.2.3. Public Water Supply Rules
The PWS reservoir operation is modeled using a set of rules. The ﬁrst are volumetric capacity constraints (in
millions of liters):
2627 
X
k 2 Owner
Reskj  55450; 8j 2 Reservoir: (13)
Withdrawals from the reservoir are only allowed if the reservoir storage is above the minimum volume.
The reservoir has seasonal storage targets (Figure 2). The model represents PWS’s preference for these stor-
age levels by penalizing storage target deviations in the objective function. Penalty factor a is calibrated
using the historical proﬁle and operational details for the PWS Reservoir.
Penaltyj 5 a
 tResj 2 X
k 2 Owner
Reskj
 (14)
In a drought public water supply companies introduce water saving initiatives, such as hosepipe bans, to
ensure basic water needs can be met. To reﬂect this, the model uses a reservoir hedging constraint in addi-
tion to the target storage deviation penalties. The larger the deviation, the smaller the withdrawals from the
reservoir become. The constraint introduced to reﬂect this hedging rule is:
WaterAbstractedji5F
X
k 2 Owner
Reskj
0
B@
1
CA; 8i 2 User; j 2 Reservoir; COji51; (15)
where F(.) is the function shown in Figure 3 which represents the relationship between the reservoir level,
as a percentage of the target, and the proportion of the demand that is satisﬁed.
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The two PWS licenses are connected by a rule on trading. When the PWS Reservoir storage volume is low, the PWS
intake license manager is not expected to sell any water. In the model, if the reservoir level is below the drought
alert curve shown in Figure 2, any further water sales are prohibited, until the level recovers. This condition is
checked ofﬂine prior to solving for each time step of the model. It is noted that once water is abstracted into the
reservoir it is stored in PWS Reservoir and is only taken out by the public water supply company for consumption.
3.2.4. Water Trading
Currently license trading is permitted in England and Wales but rarely carried out. In 2003–2008, the Envi-
ronment Agency registered 48 water license trades in England and Wales [HRWallingford, 2012], out of
which 31 trades were carried out in the East Anglia region where the Great Ouse River is located. An appli-
cation for a permanent license takes 3–4 months to be considered, and a temporary license—28 days [Envi-
ronment Agency, 2008], although, in practice, many water trade transactions take around 6 months. This
means short-term spot-market trading is not possible now, but it is being considered by the EA which is
investigating mechanisms to support water trading, including preapproved trades and a modern licensing
system [Environment Agency and Ofwat, 2012]. At present, the entire water license or a part of the licensed
volume can be traded between a buyer and seller, for a set period of time, or indeﬁnitely. If the whole
license is sold, the seller gives up his license, and the buyer applies for a new license, or amends the license
currently held for a ﬁxed charge of £135 [Environment Agency, 2011]. To carry out a permanent trade, the
buyer applies for a permanent license, and for a temporary trade, a temporary license. When the buyer’s
temporary license expires, the seller’s license is restored to its original volumetric limit.
Discussions on early model results with basin stakeholders [HRWallingford, 2012; Lumbroso et al., 2014]
revealed a concern that some abstractors, particularly farmers, were ‘‘trading themselves out of business’’
(e.g., selling most of their annual licensed volume before the irrigation season). Without requiring
Figure 2. PWS storage target and the Drought Alert Curve.
Figure 3. Public Water Supply company hedging rule.
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intertemporal optimization, or complex submodels for each abstractor type, a limit on volumes sold by agri-
cultural users was set. At each time period t,
Tradek2riveri  max f0; sLtig; 8i 2 user: (16)
This selling limit (sL) applies until the farmer abstracts a proportion ci of the expected water need (EWNi),
which is based on their historical yearly water use. For each user i,
sLti 5
sLt21i 2WaterUse
t
i ; Sum of abstraction up to time t  ci3EWNi ;
WkLii ; otherwise;
(
(17)
where WaterUse is the sum of water diverted and sold, ci is a value ranging from 0 to 1, WkLi is the normal
weekly license limit, and
sL0i 5 YrLii2ci3EWNi : (18)
This constraint sets aside a portion of the yearly license for own use and can ensure abstractors do not sell
excessively forcing them to purchase water later in the year. ci can be considered a ‘‘trade reluctance’’ coefﬁ-
cient representing the degree to which farmers prefer to save water for their own later use, and can be set
for each abstractor. This coefﬁcient allows the analyst to consider a range of market participation behaviors
(0 if the abstractor trades whenever it is economically beneﬁcial regardless of future needs; 1 if abstractors
are conservative and ﬁrst satisfy their irrigation demands).
The water market is simulated using the formulation proposed in sections 2 and 3.2. In our proof-of-
concept case study, we lacked a detailed study on farmer attitudes toward trading water so ci was set to 0.5
for all agricultural abstractors. Additionally a no-trading base-case scenario is modeled using a priority-
based allocation [e.g., Draper et al., 2004] to assess the impact of trading. In that formulation abstractors are
prioritized from upstream-to-downstream while considering HoFs and Section 57 reductions to emulate
current water management practices.
3.3. Estimating Economic Water Demands
The point expansion method was used to estimate linear demand functions for the water supply, agricul-
ture and industry sectors [James and Lee, 1971; Grifﬁn, 2006]. For energy plant cooling, the marginal water
value is assumed constant and the resultant demand curve is a horizontal line. The total beneﬁt functions
are calculated by integrating the demand functions, and are, therefore, quadratic for all sectors except for
energy, for which they are straight upward-sloping lines.
A demand function was estimated each week of the year for each abstractor. The original point of expansion
is based on average actual weekly volume abstracted and marginal value of water. A function is then derived
using literature estimates of price elasticity of demand. Currently observed volumetric charges for water
abstractions in England and Wales are set to cover administrative costs and are not set by a market and thus
do not reﬂect the economic value of water. Therefore, in this application, water values were adopted from
past research. Table 2 shows marginal values and price elasticities of water demands used in the study.
The weekly demand curves for water users were estimated based on the same marginal value across all
users within the same sector. The volume abstracted by the user determines the total beneﬁt from water
use. The demand function pivots around the y axis depending on the volume of water consumed.
There are no ecological demands such as those represented by Yang et al. [2009] and environmental ﬂows
are not assigned with economic values. Instead, environmental requirements as enforced by the Environ-
ment Agency are included as constraints (HoF conditions and Section 57 provisions).
3.4. Setting Transaction Costs
The formulation allows introducing customized transaction costs for each individual trade (i.e., each week,
the transaction cost between each individual pair of buyer and seller can be set) to represent market
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friction. Under the current system of water right transfers in England and Wales, the buyer incurs adminis-
trative costs set by the Environment Agency and the seller is not charged.
The transaction costs in our application include a one-off set price for entering into a trade and a volumetric
charge that differs according to the consumption factor of the buyer relative to that of the seller. The ﬁxed
cost was set at £13.5, a tenth of the current charge, and represents an administration charge. The variable
cost used in this study combine costs of pretrade information gathering, contracting costs and an adminis-
trative charge aimed to reduce consumptiveness. Water trade transaction costs estimated by Hearne and
Easter [1997] in Chile are an equivalent of 69$/ML (million liters). Archibald and Renwick [1998] differentiate
between explicit administrative costs and policy-induced costs associated with measures to prevent nega-
tive externalities on other users and the environment in California’s water market. Administrative costs are
14–41$/ML and policy-induced costs are 44–152$/ML. In policy-induced transaction costs Colby [1990]
includes charges incurred in the process of obtaining the authority’s permission of changing the location
and purpose of abstraction, which includes legal fees and costs of engineering and hydrologic studies. Esti-
mates of these transaction costs in the United States are on average 73$/ML [Colby, 1989].
The water transfer system in the proposed model is based on weekly trades that would be preapproved by
the environmental regulator. Taking this into account, transaction costs are expected to be lower than those
estimated in the above studies, where each trade has to be considered on a case-by-case basis, at the time
of application.
The variable cost element of the transaction cost takes into account the effect the transfer has on the envi-
ronment by incorporating the differences in consumption level of the buyer and the seller, and is propor-
tional to the volume traded. We model the case where the environmental regulator would levy a charge to
discourage trading toward more consumptive uses. This variable charge was calculated as VC5b k1k2 where
k1 and k2 are the consumption factors (fraction of water evaporated relative to diverted) of the buyer and
the seller, respectively. Constant b is a proxy for the costs the buyer incurs in negotiating a transfer with the
seller and was set to £12.5 (a tenth of the hourly charge currently levied by the EA for advice on trading a
water license [Environment Agency, 2012b]). These variable costs penalize leases from the users with lower
to the users with higher consumption factors. Table 3 shows the variable costs associated with transactions
between sectors used in the study.
3.5. Water Price Determination
The price of water in each trade was estimated using the following formula:
Priceki5hðMVi2VCÞ1ð12hÞMVk ; where 0  h  1: (19)
The unit price of a water trade should be between the willingness to pay for water of the buyer (minus vari-
able transaction costs) ðMVi2VCÞ and the seller (MVk). In this study h is taken as 0.5; the price is the average
Table 2. Marginal Values and Price Elasticities of Demand for Water Used to Build Demand Curves for Each Water Diverter in the Case
Study
Sector
Marginal Value in £/m3
(Elasticity of Demand) Sources
Water supply 1.3 (20.14) Value derived using Gibbons’ Gross Willingness to Pay formula, using £1.45/
m3 (Anglian Water charges to households for metered water [Anglian
Water, 2012]) [Gibbons, 1986; Moran and Dann, 2008], elasticity of
demand—UKWIR [2003]
Agriculture Sep to Mar 0.017 Values derived from Knox et al. [2000], using main-crop potato value and dis-
tribution of beneﬁts across growing season. Low winter value—based on
Morris et al. [2003]. Elasticity of demand—Scheierling et al. [2006]
Apr to May 0.6
Jun—0.53
Jul—0.28
Aug—0.1 (20.16)
Industry 1.86 (20.16) Value derived from average value for golf industry in Spain [Diaz et al., 2007;
Scheierling et al., 2006]
Energy 13 (N/A) Value derived using residual imputation method based on wholesale price of
energy, water requirements for power generation using CCGT technology
and costs of energy production. The value compares well with other esti-
mates [ACILTasman, 2007; Maulbetsch and DiFilippo, 2006]
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of the willingness to pay of the two trading abstractors (once the buyer’s transaction costs have been
removed).
3.6. Determination of Net Benefits With Transfers of Water Payments
Water trade payments are determined as a product of the price and the quantity traded. Net beneﬁt from
water use considering water market transactions is calculated as follows:
NetBenefiti5
totalBenefiti2
X
kUser
totalCostik2
X
kUser
Priceki 3WaterTraded
k
i ; i 2 Buyer;
totalBenefiti1
X
kUser
Priceik 3WaterTraded
k
i ; i 2 Seller;
8><
>: (20)
where WaterTradedki is the volume of water bought by user i from user k and WaterAbstracted
i
k is the vol-
ume sold by user i to user k.
3.7. Hydrological Flows
The model is run for a historical dry and normal year. Figure 4 shows natural ﬂow levels (without consider-
ing human river diversions) at the basin exit, (marked A in Figure 1) for both years. The dry year is character-
ized by very low ﬂow until mid-September; the average year ﬂows are higher overall although the summer
is still relatively dry.
4. Results
In this section, we apply the proposed formulation to model trading (i.e., weekly pair-wise water rights leas-
ing of abstraction licenses) in the Great Ouse water resource system for a normal and a dry year. A scenario
without trading and using current allocation procedures helps assess how the modeled trading affects
water use and river ﬂows.
4.1. Trading Results
Figures 5 and 6 show bought and sold water volumes aggregated by sector for the normal and dry year.
These ﬁgures only include sectors transferring over 1 ML/week. In both years, the largest transfers of water
allocations by volume are made from the public water supply company to the energy sector, comprising
99% and 94% of the total volume transferred in the normal and dry year, respectively. The power station’s
Table 3. Variable Transaction Costs, £/ML
Seller Buyer Agriculture Water Supply Industry Energy
Agriculture 12.5 12.5 20.8 25
Water supply 12.5 12.5 20.8 25
Industry 7.5 7.5 12.5 15
Energy 6.3 6.3 10.4 12.5
Figure 4. River ﬂow at the last gauge in the basin (marked A in Figure 1).
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license is affected by Hands-off
Flow conditions deﬁned with ref-
erence to gauge C (Figure 1).
When the river ﬂow at gauge C
(shown in the Figures 5 and 6,
bottom) is below Hands-off ﬂow,
the power station’s license is
temporarily suspended, and this
user satisﬁes its water demand
by buying from the public water
supply company.
Even though agricultural mar-
ginal water values are the lowest
of the four sectors, the results do
not show signiﬁcant reallocation
of water from agriculture to
higher-value uses. Over 90% of
water sold by agricultural users
was transferred to other agricul-
tural users. This is a result of the
transaction costs assumptions
posed. Each trade attracts a ﬁxed
charge that discourages large
abstractors such as power sta-
tions from buying multiple small
allocations from farmers.
River ﬂows affect trading fre-
quency, with the drier portions of
the years sustaining most trade.
Figure 6 shows that transfers
stop in mid-September of the dry
year. The reason for this is higher
availability of water from this
point onward which means
license constraints no longer pre-
vent water diversion. This also
occurs in Figure 5 with less water
traded in the wetter winter and
spring seasons.
The proposed pair-wise trading
formulation implies each individ-
ual water trade has its own price,
‘‘negotiated’’ between the two
water users. Figures 5 and 6 (top)
show weekly prices, averaged
across all trades excluding the
power station’s purchases from
PWS intake. The estimated price
for trades between the PWS
intake and the power station is
£6500/ML. This is because the
demand function for the power
station was taken as a horizontal
Figure 5.Water volumes (top) sold and (bottom) bought in Millions of liters/week by sec-
tor in the normal year. Top plot displays average weekly prices estimated for trades
between water users excluding higher priced large trades between PWS intake and the
power station. River ﬂow in billions of liters (Gigaliters, GL) per week displayed (bottom
plot) is at gauge C (see Figure 1).
Figure 6.Water volumes (top) sold and (bottom) bought in Millions of liters/week by sec-
tor in the dry year. Top plot displays average weekly prices estimated for trades between
water users excluding higher priced large trades between PWS intake and the power sta-
tion. River ﬂow in billions of liters (Gigaliters, GL) per week displayed (bottom plot) is at
gauge C (see Figure 1).
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line, and the PWS intake’s demand is fully satisﬁed through the year, and the willingness to pay is, therefore,
0. The average prices for trades between all other users range between almost 0 to £725 in the normal year
and £440 in the dry year.
Figure 7 shows locations of sellers and buyers with circle size proportional to transferred volume. Most buyers
are downstream of Bedford, and along the River Ivel (see Figure 1). This part of the basin is characterized by
high density of agricultural users and sensitivity of the river to abstractions. There are 13 water dependent
‘‘Sites of Special Scientiﬁc Interest’’ (SSSIs), such as river-fed lakes, moors, and meadows. This is reﬂected in
strict HoF restrictions on the licenses in this section of the basin. Under the current licensing regime, tributa-
ries of the river Ivel are overlicensed, and the region’s groundwater resources are overabstracted in a normal
hydrological year [Environment Agency, 2005]. This further increases the abstractors’ reliance on surface water
resources. In the modeled dry year, this produces high volumes of transfers to abstractors most affected by
scarcity.
As explained in section 3.3, the demand curves for agricultural water users were estimated based on the
same marginal value. Hence, when a Section 57 or HoF rule is activated, the affected users have a higher
value of water. Trading between farmers is driven by the market’s tendency to bring marginal values as
close as it can.
Only one agricultural abstractor reaches its yearly abstraction limit in the dry year scenario. If the selling
limit rule (section 3.2.4) is omitted, this results in a 0.24 ML/yr (0.2%) volumetric increase in water sold by
Figure 7. Locations of buyers and sellers of the normal and the dry years’ model applications.
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the farmers. This outcome is determined by the existence of a large license not constricted by HoF condi-
tions (the PWS license), which sells to the power station. If the PWS license did not sell, the next-best solu-
tion is for the power station to buy from irrigators. In that case the selling limit would have a larger effect
on farmer behavior and the reluctance coefﬁcient (section 3.2.4) would affect the trading results more.
4.2. Effect of Changes in Fixed Transaction Costs on the Benefits From Water Use
The ﬁxed transaction costs of £5, £10, and £20 were tested to observe their impact on trading. Table 4
shows that the number of trades reduces progressively as the ﬁxed charge increases. The size of the ﬁxed
charge inﬂuences whether abstractors engage in trading. With higher charge, smaller users trade less and
large water users purchase water from a smaller number of sellers.
There is no effect of changes in ﬁxed transaction costs on the power station’s and PWS intake’s water use
and gross beneﬁts from water use. Water use does not change because the magnitude of the transaction
cost is low in comparison with the high beneﬁt from water use at the power station (transaction costs as
postulated are less than 0.03% of the gross beneﬁt from water use), and PWS intake’s water demand is fully
satisﬁed in both the dry and the normal year simulations without the need for water purchases. The effect
on other users involves a slight shift in distribution; as some users decrease water purchases and water
abstractions it enables downstream users to increase abstractions. With higher ﬁxed transaction costs, small
agricultural users reduce their abstractions and water purchases allowing the PWS Reservoir to increase
abstractions and the industrial sector to purchase higher volumes of water. Table 5 shows the effect of the
increase in ﬁxed transaction cost from £5 to £20 on beneﬁts from water use, volumes abstracted and vol-
umes traded.
Agricultural users’ trading is more sensitive to ﬁxed cost changes in the normal year than in the dry year.
The volumes bought in the dry year reduce by 1% and in the normal year by 13.5% under higher transac-
tion costs. Because of the higher level of water scarcity in the dry year, the marginal values of water in the
dry year are higher and the ﬁxed cost change has less effect on trading. Also, the agricultural sector’s reduc-
tion in beneﬁts from water use due to increased ﬁxed transaction cost is higher in the dry year than in the
normal year (£5000 reduction in the dry year, £2600 in the normal year). The effect on the volume
abstracted by agricultural users is larger than on the volumes bought. As smaller farmers stop purchasing
water, larger agricultural users remain in the market, purchasing larger volumes of water, decreasing the
ability of nearby farmers to access water.
Less abstraction by agricultural users increases the river ﬂow past the PWS Reservoir. PWS Reservoir
increases river abstraction and the public water supply company increases reservoir abstraction because
storage volumes are closer to the target levels. This leads to a counterintuitive overall increase in economic
beneﬁts for the public water supply sector in the case of higher transaction costs. The overall impact of
Table 4. The Effect of Changes in Fixed Transaction Costs on the Number of Trades
Fixed Charge £5 £10 £13.5 £20
Number of trades Normal year 186 178 147 137
Dry year 332 315 299 284
Table 5. The Effect of Changes in Fixed Transaction Costs From £5 to £20 on Water Abstractions (Ml), Volumes Bought (Ml), and Gross
Beneﬁts From Water Use (£; % Increase/Decrease Due to Increased Fixed Transaction Cost)
Sector Dry Year Normal Year
Agriculture volume abstracted (Ml) 243 (25%) 226 (23%)
volume bought (Ml) 21.8 (21%) 29.5 (213.5%)
beneﬁt from water use 2£5000 (21%) 2£2600 (20.5%)
Public and public water supply reservoir intake (Ml) 28 (<0.01%) 1000 (<0.01%)
abstractions from reservoir (Ml) 1.7 (<0.01%) 22 (<0.01%)
sector beneﬁt from water use £3400 (<0.01%) £49,800 (<0.01%)
Industry volume abstracted (Ml) 0.02 (0.2%)
volume bought (Ml) 0.02 (0.2%)
beneﬁt from water use £12.5 (<0.01%)
Overall beneﬁt from water use 2£1587.5 £47,200
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increased ﬁxed transaction cost
on economic beneﬁts from water
use on all sectors depends on the
exact mix of demands and their
relative locations. In our case-
study system, economic beneﬁts
decreased by around £1600 in
the dry year but increased by
£47,200 in the normal year; a
breakdown by sector is provided
in Table 5.
4.3. Application With No Trade
To investigate how water con-
sumption by each river abstractor
is inﬂuenced by trading we ran
the model eliminating the possi-
bility of trading. The problem is
converted to a simple upstream-
to-downstream allocation scheme
using historical demands. Figure 8
compares abstractions by the
main sectors (abstracting more
than 1 ML/week) in the dry year
with trading (top graph) and with-
out (bottom graph).
Without the water market the power station is unable to abstract in most dry year weeks. When the two scenar-
ios are compared, the difference in volumes abstracted by the power station is attributable to purchases from
the PWS license. The agricultural sector also has almost 20% lower annual abstraction volumes when trading is
excluded. This is particularly true during the summer growing season. In the dry year, the spot market facilitates
movement of water between abstractors and the resultant abstraction proﬁle changes substantially.
Public Water Supply abstractions are not affected by trading as much as other sectors. PWS abstractions are
the same regardless of the availability of weekly trading because their high priority water rights (no HoFs)
mean they are never required to seek alternative supplies. The PWS abstractor is also a major seller in the
trading scenario.
Figure 9 shows the beneﬁts net of transaction costs and payments for traded water across the four sectors
(see section 3.6 for method of determination of net beneﬁts with transfers of water payments). Each of the
four sectors’ net beneﬁts are increased when short-term trading is permitted. For each week when the
power station purchases water allocations from PWS intake, half of the beneﬁt from water use by the Power
station is transferred to the PWS intake in the form of payments for water. Hence, the water supply indus-
try’s net beneﬁt increases when trading is introduced.
5. Discussion
Results of the case study showed that buyers tend to favor sellers who can supply large volumes and mini-
mize the number of transactions. The abstractors likely to beneﬁt the most from trading are those that cur-
rently have newer more restricted licenses that prevent them from obtaining water at times when it
generates beneﬁts (mostly energy cooling and agricultural licenses in our case). Although the reluctance to
trade coefﬁcient and the selling limit rule did not have a large impact in the case study due to the large
power station’s demand being satisﬁed by purchases from PWS, the formulation allows representing a
range of trading attitudes without having to know the exact reason behind them.
The Great River Ouse basin in the case study has two users dominating the market, one as a seller (PWS
intake), and one as a buyer (power station), accounting for 99% and 94% of volumes transferred in the
Figure 8. Total abstractions, by sector in dry year with (top) trading and (bottom) no
trading.
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normal and the dry year simulations, respectively. The presence of two large water abstracting traders in
the system affects water prices paid for water by other users. If the power station did not participate in trad-
ing, PWS intake would sell to smaller users, decreasing the prices paid for water by agricultural, industrial
and private water supply users. Conversely, if the public water supply company did not participate in the
market, the power station would buy water from smaller users and its high willingness to pay would mean
that some small buyers would be priced out of the market.
Table 6 summarizes the total economic gains net of transaction costs and payments for water trades from
the surface water spot market by sector in the dry and normal modeled years. The limitations of the proof-
of-concept case-study application discussed below suggest what issues might be addressed to increase pre-
cision of results.
The suitability of single-objective optimization models for simulating river basin water allocation has been
questioned in recent research because they represent a system-wide optimal solution which does not realis-
tically represent individual actions [Yang et al., 2009]. Each water user maximizes their own beneﬁt, and the
notion that users would work cooperatively to maximize the total welfare of the region is not expected in
real-world systems. Aggregate optimization and individual optimization methods have been compared by
Kuhn and Britz [2012]. The allocations of water simulated by the two methods differ for nonmarket setups.
Figure 9. Comparison of economic beneﬁts from water use net of transaction costs and payments for traded water aggregated by sector
with and without trading in a dry year: (a) Agriculture; (b) Industry; (c) Water supply; and (d) Energy. Note differences in y axis scales; the
agriculture and energy sectors beneﬁt most from trading in a drought year.
Table 6. Increase in Economic Beneﬁts From Water Use Net of Transaction Costs and Payments for Traded Water Due to Trading
Sector
Increase in Benefits
(£Million/yr), Normal Year
Increase in Benefits (%),
Normal Year
Increase in Benefits
(£Million/yr), Dry Year
Increase in Benefits
(%), Dry Year
Public and private
water supply
16 3 18 3.2
Agriculture 0.04 8 0.2 67
Energy 16 68 17 81
Industry 0.07 N/a 0.06 N/a
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For tradable water right simulations, however, the water allocations results are the same. Britz et al. [2013]
state that the aggregate optimization method is ‘‘appropriate as long as interactions between agents and
competition for resources can be interpreted in a competitive market paradigm.’’ Water markets eliminate
allocative inefﬁciencies [Kuhn and Britz, 2012], however, in real-world water markets, transaction costs pre-
vent the optimal allocation from being achieved [Garrick and Aylward, 2012; Garrick et al., 2013]. Our model
simulates water transactions that reduce allocative inefﬁciencies, subject to institutional and physical con-
straints and possible transaction costs. Takayama and Judge [1971] show that ‘‘both a welfare maximum
optimum and a Pareto optimal point satisfy market equilibrium.’’ Single-objective optimization with transac-
tion costs, therefore, can be considered an appropriate method to assess market-based allocations of water.
The Great Ouse river basin has 128 groundwater licenses. Groundwater ﬂow, its interaction with surface
water abstraction, conjunctive use with surface water and groundwater trading were not modeled in this
exercise; their inclusion could be of interest but is beyond our scope. Most groundwater licenses in the
basin are used fully and new licenses are unlikely to be issued so it is likely that a regional water market
would not heavily change how groundwater is used.
The model’s results are driven by (a) the economic demand curves used to represent each abstractor’s
water demand; (b) the transaction costs assumed between buyers and sellers; and (c) abstractor water man-
agement practices represented by constraints. Transaction costs were set to estimates of ﬁxed and variable
costs users could incur if a system of preapproved short-term trading was established in England and Wales.
The modeling framework allows the analyst to represent more sophisticated abstractor preferences by tai-
loring transaction costs between any trade pair and varying these in each time step. For example, negotiat-
ing multiple trades with a large number of small users could take a substantial amount of time for a large
industrial user. The transaction costs in the current formulation make steps toward representing this time
spent on negotiation in monetary terms, by ﬁxed cost. Also, the rules entered as constraints allow ﬂexibility
to represent any number of criteria that overrun economic considerations as represented by the demand
curves and transaction costs. As with all modeling, and particularly those representing human behaviors
and decisions, the model is only as good as the data and assumptions built into it. The case study would
beneﬁt from a reﬁnement of the demand curves, abstractor rules, and transaction costs used to represent
abstractor preferences. The question in models such as these is how correct must these be to enable the
model to produce valuable insights about how the system would perform under different policies (e.g.,
licensing regimes and trading rules). In this case study, we have opted for simple methods (linear demand
curves, transaction costs that only vary by abstractor type) to ease result interpretation.
This paper brings up the issue of whether single-objective function (‘‘centralized’’ optimization) is appropri-
ate for modeling river basin water management, or if newer decentralized methods are more appropriate.
In recent efforts to model water resource allocations, agent behavior has been represented within a decen-
tralized optimization-based framework [Yang et al., 2009], moving away from the assumptions of full infor-
mation sharing to analyze different levels of cooperation between agents [Giuliani and Castelletti, 2013]. We
suggest this study shows traditional mathematical programming as used typically in hydro-economic mod-
els [Harou et al., 2009] can be useful in simulating water markets. The assumption is that those transactions
which generate the most regional beneﬁts would also likely be attractive to individual proﬁt-maximizing
agents. If the analyst were to think this was not the case for a particular buyer or seller, or for a speciﬁc pair
of these, special rules or customized transaction costs can be added to reﬂect this. The proposed framework
is partially backed by economic theory in that under a market with perfect information those transactions
that most beneﬁt individuals concurrently most beneﬁt the region. While a river basin will never be a per-
fect market, the online trading bulletin boards and preapproved trades being considered by the Environ-
ment Agency of England and Wales mean these assumptions may be close enough for model results to be
informative and help policy-makers assess system performance.
We see this contribution as a step toward the goal of simulating markets. Our goal is to partially address the
omissions of past hydro-economic modeling efforts meant to evaluate water trading systems as noted by Grif-
ﬁn [2006] (see section 1). In the proposed approach, individual trade transactions are tracked, detailed spatially
and temporally speciﬁc transaction costs can be assigned, and abstractor behaviors are represented by con-
straint equations. More sophisticated behavioral models, perhaps borrowing from game theory [Lejano and
Davos, 1995; Madani, 2010; Mahjouri and Ardestani, 2010; €Ozelkan and Duckstein, 1996; Rogers, 1969; Wang
et al., 2008] or multiagent system modeling theory [Barreteau and Bousquet, 2000; Berger, 2001; Bonabeau,
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2002; Feuillette et al., 2003; Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011; van Oel et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2009] could
potentially improve the behavioral component of this water market model. Currently agents make decisions
each time step with minimal consideration of decisions made in previous time steps and others likely to occur
in the future. Adding strategic decision points, like crop choice or infrastructure investment, at seasonal or
annual scale could be appropriate extensions. The ability of agents to abstract water strategically across multi-
ple licenses could also be added. In our case, this was done crudely using rules which for example blocked
PWS from selling water if water use restrictions are in place due to low reservoir levels.
6. Conclusions
This paper described a generalized optimization model built to simulate water reallocation in a surface
water spot market where downstream trades are preapproved by an environmental regulator. The model
uses a node-arc multicommodity formulation that tracks individual seller-buyer transactions throughout a
water resource network. The model’s core driver is economic welfare maximization where demand curves
are used to identify trades that generate most beneﬁts. Transaction costs, deﬁnable for each buyer-seller
pair, reﬂect costs incurred from pair-wise water trades. Abstractor-speciﬁc water management practices and
plausible trading behaviors are represented as rules using constraints. The model was applied to the Great
Ouse river basin in Eastern England which has 94 active public water supply, energy sector, industrial and
agricultural surface water right holders. Current water management rules and behaviors including historical
abstractions, environmental restrictions, and potential stakeholder trading behaviors are included. The
water resource system is modeled with a weekly time step for a normal and dry historical year. A no-trading
scenario is compared with the modeled trading to assess the potential hydrological and economic out-
comes of the simulated water market. Results showed buyers favor sellers who can sell larger volumes to
minimize the number of transactions. The basin’s energy and agricultural licenses have the strictest environ-
mental restrictions and beneﬁt most from trades (68% and 8% increase in economic beneﬁts from water
use for the normal year and 81% and 67% in the dry year, for energy and agriculture, respectively). The pri-
mary model application limitations include the model’s assumptions of perfect market information, the
inclusion of only simpliﬁed longer-term planning, and the nonconsideration of strategic behavior of abstrac-
tors with multiple licenses. Groundwater use is not included in the model, but given the basin’s ground-
water resources are overabstracted, it would likely not change much under a surface water market.
Appendix A: Nomenclature
HoF Scenario where Hands-off Flow conditions are applied in which users can no lon-
ger abstract or trade water.
junction No-demand and nonstorage nodes which join two or more links in the network.
User The set of all licensed river abstractors including Agriculture, Industry, Water sup-
ply, and Energy.
Owner The set of all water right holders, reservoirs, and the river.
xkij Decision variable, the water ﬂowing from node i to j with license holder k.
inFli External hydrological inﬂow at junction node i.
COij Connectivity matrix which contains 1 if node i is connected to node j, 0 if no
connection.
pReskj Reservoir j storage carried over from previous time step with water license k.
Reskj Reservoir j storage with water license k.
tResj Reservoir j target.
WaterAbstractedki Water consumed by user i which is either bought from owner k or abstracted from
river using user i’s license.
Tradek2riveri Water license leased for one time step by user i.
ReturnFlowij Water returned back to the river at downstream junction node j of user i based on
the consumption factor of user i.
DWij Junction node j downstream of user i.
consFactori Fraction of water evaporated relative to diverted for user i.
Dischargej Discharge sink j at the mouth of the river.
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WkLii Weekly license allowance for user i to abstract water from river.
YrLii Yearly license allowance for user i to abstract water from river.
Penaltyj Deviation of reservoir j from its target storage volume.
flGAj Flow at gauge j.
AlGAj Allowable ﬂow at gauge j.
RuGAij Information with regards to the hands of ﬂow condition which equals one if user i
abstraction is controlled with the level of ﬂow at gauge j.
Q95GAj Q95 ﬂow level at gauge j.
UpGAij Agriculture user i upstream of gauge j.
WaterUseti Water used by user i at time t including the abstraction and trading.
sLti Selling limit for user i at time t.
EWNi Historical expectation of water needs for user i.
totalBenefiti Total beneﬁt for user i.
totalCostik Cost of trading incurred for user i purchased from user k.
dki Variable costs for user i purchased from user k.
cki Fixed per trade costs for user i purchased from user k.
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Erratum
In the ﬁrst sentence of the second paragraph of the Introduction, the words ‘‘The design of ﬂexible water markets to perform at the high-
est level’’ have been replaced with the words ‘‘Modeling water markets.’’
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